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STATUTORY AND PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS UPON
NEW YORK CITY'S LEGISLATIVE POWERS
W. BERNARD RICHLAND*
"NE of the remarkable phenomena of New York City Government is
" the sharp decline of the City's legislative powers and their exercise
over the past one hundred and twenty-five years.'
On both the state level and on the federal level, legislative powers have
been exercised over a constantly expanding area while those of New York
City have been cut down by Constitution, by law and by practice. The
fact is that the principal New York City legislative body, the Council,'
which is in session all year round, which is familiar with the City's prob-
lems and is responsible to its people, has been largely relegated to the task
of naming streets after neighborhood heroes and transferring land from
one City Department to another. Nowhere does this appear more clearly
than upon a comparison of the ordinances adopted by the Mayor, the
Aldermen and Commonalty of New York City in 1827 and the local laws
adopted by the New York City Government in recent years. The 1827
ordinances covered a wide area of the life of the community, while with
few exceptions, local laws of New York City in recent years have been
strikingly lacking in significance 3
* Member of the New York Bar; Assistant Corporation Counsel of New York City and
Chief of the Opinions and Legislation Division of the City Law Department.
1. The decline of the City's legislative power has been attributed to the quality of the
personnel of the Board of Aldermen. See Shaw, The History of New York City's Legislature
1-14, 30-34, 46, 50, 56-109 (1954). However, other writers have observed that the quality of
local government is often a reflection of the paucity of its powers and its subservience to
rural-dominated state legislatures. See, e.g., Reed, Municipal Government in the United
States 98, 102-03, 146 (rev. ed. 1934).
2. New York City's legislative power resides in the New York City Council, the Board of
Estimate and the Mayor. Under the New York City Charter, local laws are initiated In the
Council, N.Y.C. Charter § 21 (1938) and are subject to veto of the Mayor, with the proviso
that such a veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote, N.Y.C. Charter § 38 (1938). How-
ever, a substantial body of local legislative power resides in the Board of Estimate which acts
as an upper house of the City Legislature, in regard to proposed laws which amend any pro-
vision of the Charter, transfer or change the powers and duties of or confer new powers and
duties upon or prescribe qualifications, number, mode of selection or removal, terms of office
or compensation of City officers, reduce or repeal taxes, fees or charges or interest or penalties,
N.Y.C. Charter § 39 (1938).
3. The Municipal Ordinances of 1827 (Laws and Ordinances Made and Established by the
Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, in Common Council Convened,
A.D. 1827) reveal the following significant enactments:
A law to regulate auction sales (c. 3) ; a law to regulate carts and cartmen which provided
for licensing and fixed rates for transportation of scheduled goods at scheduled rates (c. 6) ;
a law to license and regulate chimney sweeps which provided for licensing and fixed hours
of labor for employees. In what must have been a radical departure, it prohibited the
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employment of boys under 11 and prohibited a chimney sweep from requiring his appren-
tices to work before 6 am. or after 4 p.m. in the winter and before S am. or after 6 p.m.
during the remainder of the year (c. 7) ; a law regulating the measurement of coal (c. 9);
a law to regulate the fees upon making distress for rent (c. 11) ; a law regulating hackney
coaches and carriages which provided for licensing and fixing of charges and rates (c. 16);
a law relating to retailers of spiritous liquors (c. 21); a law regulating pawn brokers and
dealers in second-hand goods (c. 26); a law regulating public porters which provided for
their licensing and fixed rates (c. 28) ; a law respecting the issuance of tavern and excise
licenses which regulated the licensing of liquor establishments (c. 46); a law regulating the
sale and manufacture of bread which fixed the size of loaves (c. 51). It will be noted that
many of the above described ordinances of 1827 dealt with matters now regarded as of
"state concern" and either completely beyond the power of the City to deal with under the
Constitution or from which the City is excluded by statute. (See note 6 infm.)
In contrast to the group of significant laws adopted by the legislative authorities in 1827
it is difficult to characterize more than seven of the one hundred twenty-nine local laws of
the City of New York for 1954 as of equal significance. The 1954 local laws which can be
appropriately so characterized are Local Law No. 1 which established a new City Labor
Department; Local Laws Nos. 6 and 128 which provided exemption from taxation to en-
courage construction of new housing; Local Law No. 24 which prohibited the conversion of
dwellings to rooming houses; Local Law No. 34 which established the position of school
crossing guard; Local Law No. 42 which extended the existing local laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation in government-aided housing; Local Law No. 46 which authorized the use of stock
cars as taxicabs, and Local Law No. 116 which established a Community Mental Health
Board.
Forty-eight of the Local Laws of 1954 dealt with technical amendments to the Building
Code and the Electrical Code, of which thirty-seven dealt with specific amendments relating
to the maintenance of sprinkler systems. Fourteen of the Local Laws named streets and
public places after neighborhood heroes and eighteen provided for the transfer of land from
one City Department to another City Department.
The year 1954 does not provide a proper basis for considering the extent to which the City
has exercised legislative powers. Indeed, that year was among the most fruitful in the past
decade. A more typical example is provided in the Local Laws of New York City enacted
during the year 1951. There were two hundred and two local laws and a breakdown of their
characteristics is most revealing. Fifty-two of the laws, more than one-quarter of their total
number, named particular streets and playgrounds after local heroes; fifteen of the local laws
transferred land from one municipal department to another; sixty-two were technical changes
in the building laws. Almost all of the rest of the local laws dealt with comparatively in-
consequential aspects of the internal government of the City.
The only local laws for 1951 which can properly be characterized as significant were Local
Law No. 41 which prohibited discrimination in government-assisted housing; Local Law No.
42, which established a Commission for the Foster Care of Children; Local Laws Nos. 44
and 45 which required policemen to give thirty days' notice of their intention to retire on a
pension; Local Laws Nos. 97 and 98 which provided for the enforcement of Federal Price
Regulations, and the group of local laws which are re-enacted from time to time, providing
excise taxes pursuant to special State enabling acts and the technical amendments to those
tax laws. Local Laws Nos. 59, 60, 90, 91, 92, 199.
In 1951, the City Council seems to have devoted a great deal of its energies in conidering
precatory resolutions, the purport of which ranged from exhorting the State Legislature to act
in regard to a variety of matters affecting the City Government, to urging that the people of
Ireland be given the right to choose their own form of government. N.Y.C. Council Res.
Nos. 264-493.
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It is the purpose of this study to sketch briefly the constitutional and
statutory provisions which have brought this about and the restrictive
interpretations by the courts along with the practices of the City Govern-
ment which have aided in this result.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The City Home Rule provisions of the New York Constitution are con-
tained in article IX. Section 11 provides in general that the Legislature
may act in relation to the "property, affairs or government" of cities only
by general laws which apply in terms and effect to all cities, except upon
the request of a particular city or cities and a two-thirds vote.4 Section 12
empowers every city to adopt local laws relating to their property, affairs
or government, and, in addition, to adopt local laws relating to its officers,
business, obligations, streets and property, transit facilities, taxes and the
conduct of their inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety
and health. However, all such laws must be "not inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the state." '
We have pointed out at length elsewhere, that the grant of legislative
power to cities, like the guarantee of immunity from state interference
with cities contained in the Home Rule provisions of the Constitution, is
largely illusory.' It would serve little purpose to repeat here the observa-
tions which have already been made. Suffice it to say that the term, "prop-
erty, affairs or government" which sets the area of City immunity from
State regulation has been so construed by the courts as to mean neither
property, nor affairs nor government in the ordinary sense in which those
words are used in common parlance. Since the immunity of cities from
legislative interference is limited to interference by special legislation with
their "property, affairs or government" and since those terms have been
narrowly construed by the courts and since local laws must be consistent
with all laws properly enacted by the Legislature, local legislative power
is at the mercy of a State Legislature which has shown no inclination to be
merciful in this regard.7 In fact, the State Legislature can act, as it has,
by special law (notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution appears to
authorize only general legislation) in regard to the principal "property" of
the City, its costly transit system' and its costly water supply systemY It
4. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 11 (1938).
5. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12 (1938).
6. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311 (1954);
Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York: II, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 598 (1955).
7. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York: II, 55 Colum. L. Rev. $98,
pt. XV (1955).
8. Salzman v. Impellitteri, 203 Misc. 486, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 369 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 281 App.
Div. 1023, 122 N.Y.S. 2d 787 (1st Dep't), modified, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E. 2d 543 (1953).
9. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 982-7.1 (1937); Opinion of N.Y. Att'y Gen. March 10, 1954.
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can similarly interfere with its principal "affairs" and "government," its
power of taxation," its power to become indebted,' its power over the
school system," and effectively abolish the legislative powers of the City
in regard to these subjects. Moreover, since City immunity from legislative
interference does not preclude interference by general laws applicable
alike to all cities,' 3 the power of local legislation is further drastically
narrowed by laws affecting cities generally.
lI. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Cty Home Ride Law
The principal statutory provisions which further reduce the legislative
power of New York City are contained in the City Home Rule Law and in
the New York City Charter. 4 Section 11 of the City Home Rule Law,"5
like article IX, section 12 of the Constitution, sets forth in broad terms a
grant of power far more apparent than real. Cities are authorized to adopt
local laws in relation to the framework of their government, the manner
in which their officers shall be selected and paid, control over their transit
facilities, their streets and their other properties, control over their taxing
and indebtedness powers and the protection, safety and welfare of their
inhabitants.
Having expressed a generous, general grant of legislative power to cities,
the City Home Rule Law then goes on to cut those powers down close to
the vanishing point. This is accomplished by two devices.
Under section 21,6 there is completely eliminated from the field of local
legislative power the following basic subjects, among others:
(1) Power to increase tax or debt limits fixed by law;
(2) Power to change local requirements as to the issuance of bonds;
(3) Power in regard to the City's school system or any teachers' retirement system;
(4) Power to adopt legislation which "applies to or affects" any provision of the Labor
Law, the Workmen's Compensation Law or the Multiple Dwelling Law;
Cf. Board of Supervisors v. Water Power and Control Commiss-on, 227 App. Div. 345, 238
N.Y. Supp. 55 (3d Dep't 1929), aff'd, 255 N.Y. 531, 175 N.E. 300 (1930).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Ibid.
12. Ernksen v. City of New York, 167 Amc 42, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1937); People,
ex rel Elkind v. Rosenblum, 184 AMsc. 916, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 295 (Sup. Ct.), aftd, 269 App. Div.
859, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 526 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 929, 63 N.E. 2d 34 (1946). See alo
cases cited in dissenting opinion of Desmond, J. in Danirman v. Board of Education, 305 N.Y.
532, 544, 546-47, 119 N.E. 2d 373, 381, 382-83 (1954).
13. -N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 11 (1938) ; Richland, supra note 6, passin.
14. The Charter, although adopted by a referendum of the electorate of New York City,
has been accorded by the courts the status of a state statute. See Daniman v. Board bf
Education, 305 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E. 2d 373 (1954).
15. N.Y.C. Home Rule Law art. IT, § 11 (1939).
16. N.Y.C. Home Rule Law art. I, § 21 (1939).
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(5) Power to enact legislation relating to judicial review of civil service disciplinary
proceedings;
(6) Power to amend a City Charter, contrary to its own terms or to enact laws pro-
hibited by the City Charter.
The second device by which the City's power to legislate is limited
under the City Home Rule Law (section 15) is by requiring that certain laws
adopted by the City shall become effective only if approved at a refer-
endum by a majority of the City's voters.17
Obviously, a referendum on a local law is a highly expensive under-
taking.18 Moreover, it necessarily delays the enactment of laws. Indeed,
so expensive and inconvenient is this device that in the past ten years it
has been used only once. When the City needs legislation which is subject
to referendum, it is driven by the twin forces of convenience and economy
to solicit the State Legislature to enact such legislation in order to avoid
the referendum provisions of the City Home Rule Law.
The subjects covered by section 15 are, among others, the following:
(1) Changes in the local legislative body;
(2) Changes in the veto power of the Mayor;
(3) Changes in the law of succession to the mayoralty, abolition of an elective office,
or a change in the method of nomination, election, salary and powers;
(4) Creation of a new elective office, changes in laws relating to public utility fran-
chises, changes in a city civil service commission, the reduction of the salary of a
city officer or employee fixed by statute;
(5) Adoption of a new Charter.
All local laws within the range of those catalogued above can become
effective only if approved by a majority of the voters.
New York City Charter
The New York City Charter" duplicates the provisions of City Home
Rule Law section 15 and adds other categories of laws fettering the City's
legislative power through this device by requiring a referendum for any
local law which: transfers power from any agency, the head of which is
appointed by the Mayor to one, the head of which is not so appointed,
or vice versa; dispenses with any provisions of the Charter which requires
a public notice and hearing before official action can take place; changes
a provision of the Charter relating to the audit of the City's accounts;
removes Charter restrictions on the sale, lease or other disposition of City
property; curtails the power of the City Planning Commission, or changes
17. N.Y.C. Home Rule Law art. II, § 15 (1939).
18. The cost of a referendum in New York City, if such were mandatory at a general
election under N.Y.C. Charter § 40 (1936), would be absorbed in the cost of same and would
therefore be unascertainable. The cost of a referendum at a special election pursuant to § 15
of the City Home Rule is estimated at approximately $800,000.
19. N.Y.C. Charter c. 2, § 40 (1938).
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1955] NEW YORK CITY'S LEGISLATIVE POWERS 331
the vote of the Board of Estimate requiring any City Planning matters;
repeals or amends any of a large group of sections of the City Charter.
Thus, the practical effect of the referendum requirements of the City
Home Rule Law and the City Charter have been to severely cut down the
City's own legislative power in regard to matters which are patently of
local concern and which should properly be left to the legislative author-
ities of the City. In all the years since the present New York City Charter
was adopted in 1938, only one local law has been adopted by the Council
which required its submission to referendum-the amendment to sub-
division b of section 22 of the New York City Charter 0 which abolished
proportional representation and provided for the election of councilmen
from Senate districts, which was approved at referendum held Novem-
ber 4, 1947. Whatever other changes have been made in the Charter and
which would have required referendum if made by local law have been
adopted by State legislation passed upon the request of the City and two-
thirds vote of each house of the Legislature. This method was used in
regard to such details of City administration as, for example, the amend-
ment of the Charter so as to provide for the office of Vice-Chairman of the
City Planning Commission; 2 an amendment permitting the President of
the Council to designate one of his appointees to act in his place upon the
Board of Estimate;2  an amendment to increase from $1,000 to $2,500
the amount of a purchase which would not require competitive bidding;"
an amendment to reorganize the City Civil Service Commission and estab-
lish a Department of Personnel.24
Other Statutory Provisions
The statute books abound with other special laws in the area of "state
concern" and general laws which effectively limit New York City's power
of local legislation. It would serve little purpose to enumerate those
statutes. For the purpose of this article, we need only point out three
typical examples.
As we have seen, both the Constitution and the City Home Rule Law
purport to vest legislative power in the City over its "transit facilities."
Yet, by enacting laws dealing with the City's transit system, the City has
been effectively ousted from this important field.2- Pension laws dealing
20. N.Y.C. Charter c. 2, § 22(b) (1936).
21. N.Y. Laws c. 339 (1952) ; N.Y. Laws c. 56 (1953).
22. N.Y. Laws c. 434 (1950).
23. N.Y. Laws c. 852 (1949); N.Y. Laws c. 788 (1953).
24. N.Y. Laws c. 354 (1954).
25. Salzman v. Impellitteri, note 8 supra and Connolly v. Stand, 192 Ic. 872, 83
N.YS. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 274 App. Div. 877, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 922 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 298
N.Y. 658, 82 N.E. 2d 399 (1948). See also Browne v. New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
exclusively with City employees are clearly within the province of normal,
local legislative power. Nevertheless, this power was withdrawn from
cities by the Legislature."8 Laws relating to the City's fiscal affairs are
manifestly matters of local concern, yet by the enactment of the Local
Finance Law, the City has lost its power in this regard.2 The final exam-
ple2' was obviously directed solely at New York City. It provides that in
every city in which the Mayor and the Presiding Officer of the local legis-
lative body are elected at the same time and for the same term and in
which such Presiding Officer succeeds to the office of the Mayor, he shall
continue in his office for the remainder of the Mayor's term. The person
succeeding to the office of such Presiding Officer shall continue for the
remainder of his term. This provision was patently adopted to displace
the succession provisions of the New York City Charter, in order to avoid
the situation which took place in 1950 when a vacancy election for the
New York City Mayor coincided with State elections,"0 an occurrence
which the dominant political party obviously found contrary to its interest
and one to be avoided."0 The statutes dealing with the City's water supply
system, similarly withdraw that subject from the area of local legislative
power.3'
III. NEGLECT oF LoCAL LEGISLATIVE PowERs
Not only has local legislative power been limited and hampered in the
manner described above by constitutional, statutory and Charter provi-
sions, but it has been further cut down by a natural timidity on the part
of the City's legislative body, induced by a restrictive judicial interpreta-
tion of their powers,32 from which the City's legislative body only now
(1925) and Int. Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 242 App. Div. 300, 275 N.Y. Supp. S
(3d Dep't 1934).
26. N.Y. Laws c. 296 (1953). See Gorman v. City, 280 App. Div. 39, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 711
(lst Dep't), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E. 2d 881 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 962 (1953);
Annot., 105 A.L.R. 259, 263 (1936).
27. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 67, app. A, at 31-58 (1944).
28. N.Y. Laws c. 356 (1952), which had the effect of replacing the succession provisions
of N.Y.C. Charter c. 1, § 10 and c. 2, § 29 (1938).
29. See Joseph v. Corsi, 277 App. Div. 351, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 49 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 301 N.Y.
742, 95 N.E. 2d 412 (1950).
30. See Richland, supra note 7, at 621, n. 201.
31. See note 8, supra.
32. See, e.g., County Securities v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 15 N.E. 2d 179 (1938) ; Ainslceo v.
Lounsberry, 275 App. Div. 729, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 857, appeal denied, 275 App. Div. 865, 89
N.Y.S. 2d 240 (3d Dep't 1949); Scheiffelin v. O'Leary, 219 App. Div. 660, 220 N.Y. Supp.
587 (1st Dep't 1927); People ex rel. Elkind v. Rosenblum, 184 Misc. 916, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 295,
(Sup. Ct. 1945), aftd, 269 App. Div. 859, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 526 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y.
929, 68 NE. 2d 34 (1946) ; People v. Gorman, 133 Misc. 161, 231 N.Y. Supp. 85 (City Ct. City
of Binghamton 1928). A particularly discouraging example is provided by 749 Broadway
Realty Corp. v. Boyland, 207 Misc. 76, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1955) in which a court
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seems to be emerging. The grand, although illusory tabulation of powers
set forth in Constitution article IX, section 12 and in City Home Rule Law
section 11 leaves open to City legislation an area which has not as yet
been fully exploited-legislative power to deal with matters regarded as
both of State and local concern, but as to which the Legislature has not
completely occupied the field. An illustrative example is the City's power
to enact local laws applying more restrictive requirements in tenements
than are provided in the Multiple Dwelling Law.33
Not until this year has a substantial attempt been made to exercise
legislative power in regard to the latter. An elaborate Multiple Dwelling
Code supplementary to and containing more severe restrictions than the
Multiple Dwelling Law has been before the New York City Council for
some time.
3 4
Up to now, changes in laws applicable to multiple dwellings desired by
the City have been requested of the State Legislature. Such was the case
even prior to 1950 when the Multiple Dwelling Law applied solely to New
York City3 5 Even now, although the statute applies also to Buffalo, its
dominant purposes and effects are upon New York City. 0
The assertion of local legislative power even when its existence was
doubtful, has, upon occasion, resulted in decisions upholding the validity
of the local laws. Thus, although there was doubt as to the right of New
York City to adopt an independent local law enforcing O.P.A. regulations
and providing an additional punishment for violation of those regulations,
the so-called Sharkey O.P.A. Law37 was enacted and its validity was up-
struck down a local law designed by New York City to require taxpayers objecting to as-
sessments to fie with their protest a statement of income and expenses N.Y.C. Charter § 162,
as amended by N.Y.C. Local Law No. 128 of 1952. The N.Y. City Home Rule Law § 11
(1939), expressly authorized cities to adopt local laws to aid in the assessment and collection
of taxes. See Bill Jacket of Laws 1939, c. 867 on file in the State Library, Albany, N.Y.
Yet, a local law enacted for such a purpose has thus far been held invalid as beyond the
City's power. An appeal is pending.
33. As we have noted above, the N.Y. City Home Rule Law § 21 (1939), prohibits the
City from enacting laws which "affects" any provision of the Multiple Dwelling Law. See
Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, pt. VI (1954).
However, the Multiple Dwelling Law § 3 (1946), expressly authorizes the City to enact more
restrictive regulation than is provided in that statute.
34. N.Y.C. Council Int. 391, Pr. 346, Nov. 16, 1954; N.Y.C. Council Int. 395, Pr. 459,
Apr. 5, 1955; N.Y.C. Council Int. 441, Pr. 518, July 12, 1955. These bills, and particularly,
N.Y.C. Council Int. 441, Pr. 518, are an interesting experiment in legidsation, not only in their
substance, covering, as they do, a wide field of regulation, but in their form, in which tabula-
tions of provisions are used to facilitate an understanding of the varied occupancy require-
ments of different types and classes of tenements.
35. See Note of Commission on amendment of § 3 of N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law, of
1950 in 35-A McKinney's Consolidated Laws (Supp.).
36. See Legislative Committee Notes to amended sections of Multiple Dwelling Law in
35-A McKinney's Consolidated Laws.
37. N.Y.C. Local Law No. 35 (1945).
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held by the Court of Appeals.38 Similarly, local legislative bodies were
discouraged for many years from enacting laws exempting their cities
from the enormous burden of liability for defective sidewalks in the ab-
sence of written notice, by reason of an Appellate Division decision deny-
ing their right to do so in the face of an inconsistent State statute.8
However, to the surprise of municipal law officers throughout the State,
the same court overruled itself, held the same local law valid40 and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.41 Fortunately, the city, in that
case, left the local law on its books and so was able to try again and
succeed in upholding its validity eighteen years later. Other municipalities
which, despite the decision, adopted similar local laws, had their judgment
acquitted.
On the other hand, such attempts, in the presence of doubt, have been
unsuccessful but nevertheless have gone far to achieve their results. Thus,
the City of New York, faced with the removal of Federal regulations in
regard to rent control, determined to adopt its own body of laws upon
this subject.42 The court struck down the so-called Sharkey Rent Control
laws upon the ground that they conflicted with provisions of the Civil
Practice Act in regard to summary proceedings. 43 However, the State
Legislature was obliged by the very existence of the local laws to validate
them44 and later to enter the field of rent regulation itself and assign the
task to a State agency.45
38. People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E. 2d 702 (1945).
39. Hayward v. Schenectady, 251 App. Div. 607, 297 N.Y. Supp. 736 (3d Dep't 1937).
40. Fullerton v. Schenectady, 285 App. Div. 545, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 916 (3d Dep't 1955).
41. 309 N.Y. 701, 127 NME. 2d 333 (1955). An interesting sidelight to the Fullerton case
is provided in a veto message of Governor Dewey, who refused to approve a proposed State
statute overruling the effect of the Hayward case. See McKinney's Session Laws of New
York for 1953 at 2173. The basis of the Hayward decision was that the local law, which
required written notice of a sidewalk defect before municipal liability could arise, was Incon-
sistent with Second Class Cities Law § 244 (1945). Bills were passed by the Legislature In
1953 (Ass. Intro. 1261, Pr. 1287, Ass. Intro. 3229, Pr. 3695) to amend that statute and the
Village Law so as to incorporate in these statutes provisions similar to those contained In the
Schenectady local law struck down in the Hayward case. Governor Dewey, refused to ap-
prove the bill upon the ground that it would work a hardship on injured citizens. Having
failed to obtain State legislation, the municipalities, adopted local laws, in the teeth of the
Hayward decision, (See, e.g., Albany Local Law No. 1 (1953) ; Troy Local Law No. 2 (1952) ;
and their assertion of a power which the courts had already denied them was later justified.
See also, First Interim Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort LiabilUty,
Leg. Doc. No. 42, at 22-23 (1955).
42. N.Y.C. Local Laws No. 73 (1949).
43. F.T.B. Corp. v. Goodman, 300 N.Y. 140, 89 N.E. 2d 865 (1949).
44. N.Y. Laws c. 14, c. 487 (1949); N.Y. Laws c. 1 (1950). See Tartaglia v. McLaughlin,
297 N.Y. 419, 79 N.E. 2d 809 (1948).
45. N.Y. Laws c. 250 (1950); N.Y. Laws cc. 36, 341 (1951). See Friedlander & Currerl,
New York State Rent Control xiii-xvi, (1950).
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IV. EXPAN SON OF LocAL LEGISLATIVE PowER
Even assuming the exercise of its maximum legislative powers, New
York City's government will remain hampered until there is a revision of
both the Charter and special and general laws which limit its authority.
To a City government faced with the day-to-day problems of managing
its affairs, it matters little whether the barrier to their solution lies in laws
applicable to all cities or only to New York City. The generality of a
restrictive statute is of no merit in such a case. Clearly, a city with the
population of a continent should be permitted to govern its internal affairs,
adjust the structure of its government and deal with its property without
the interference of a State Legislature.
General laws and Charter provisions alike which hamper a city govern-
ment in this regard should be re-examined and revised. For example, a
City which, for half a century has effectively legislated in regard to the
structure and maintenance of large commercial and industrial buildings40
should be similarly entrusted with broad legislative power over its apart-
ment houses.4 7 It seems hardly consistent with efficient and responsible
government to require the City to run to Albany with its tenement housing
problems and pray the State Legislature to enact the amendments to the
Multiple Dwelling Law which time and the experience of the Building
Department have shown to be necessary.
Similarly, the City's method of incurring indebtedness is or should be
its own concern and it ought not be obliged to seek State legislation to deal
with such matters.
However, entirely apart from such considerations is the situation in
regard to matters which it is universally conceded should be within the
orbit of a City's normal powers, as, for example, the form and operations of
its government.4 By general law, and by Charter provision," such powers
46. N.Y. Laws c. 466 § 407 (1901).
47. See Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929) and Richland, supra note 33.
48. The extent to which City legislative power is lacking in regard to matters of internal
administration of City Government and purely local concern is indicated by the examination
of the State statutes for any recent year. Literally scores of statutes are adopted in each
session of the State Legislature dealing with matters affecting New York City alone in its
property, in its government and in its affairs, in any reasonable sense in which those words
can be defined. In the 1955 Legislative Session which marked a low point in recent legilative
interference with New York City (cf. the 1953 experience in which the City was assailed
upon all sides by the Legislature. See Richland, supra note 7, pt. XI) statutes were adopted
relating to such matters of purely local concern as the demolition of the Third Avenue Ele-
vated, after the discontinuance of its use as a transportation facility (N.Y. Laws c. 657);
the pension rights of medical officers of the Fire Department (N.Y. Laws c. 122); the reloca-
tion and maintenance upon City property of an historical building known as Hamilton Grange
(N.Y. Laws c. 285) ; authorization for the sale of City-owned waterfront lands (N.Y. Laws
cc. 502, 833, 70, 69, 554, 490, 67, 456, 209) and the acquisition of cemetery lands in the Bronx
(N.Y. Laws c. 337). The cited chapters of the Laws of 1955 were adopted by a two-thirds
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are effectively removed from the domain of New York City's government,
both directly and through the referendum device which, while preserving
the appearance of vesting legislative power in the City, actually withholds
it. 5 0
There are many factors which would seem to point to the desirability of
expanding the legislative power of New York City. In the first place, it
seems hard to reconcile with principles of representative and responsible
government the present situation in which the largest and wealthiest city
in the world is held on tight State legislative "leading strings." 51 The City
Government is obviously closer to and more cognizant of its problems
than is the Legislature in Albany, a majority of whose members have
neither responsibility to the City's electorate nor awareness of the City's
governmental problems. The New York City Council and the Board of
Estimate are in session all year round. They provide forums for the
consideration and discussion of governmental matters. Their members
are accountable to the City's people. A few typical examples demonstrate
the value of these circumstances. The first is presented in the elaborate
discussion of the complex and far-reaching proposed City Multiple
Dwelling Code5" in study sessions and Committee hearings on the bills.
These hearings have been going on from time to time since the end of
19 54 .1 The second example is the public discussion before the New York
City Council which preceded the enactment of Local Law No. 46 of
1954, authorizing the use of stock cars as taxicabs.54 Going back a few
years, another typical example is the public discussion before the Council
and the Board of Estimate preceding the enactment of Local Laws Nos.
vote at the request ofthe City, it not having power to adopt them itself. See also pt. II of
text supra.
49. See pt. II of text supra.
50. The New York City Charter Revision Commission described the Charter referendum
provisions as designed as "safeguards against the ill-considered adoption of fundamental
amendments." (Report of New York City Charter Revision Commission, in Williams Press
Edition of New York City Charter and Administrative Code, xxxv (1943)). In the first
place, several of the subjects hardly fit within the character of "fundamental." In the second
place, the absolute power of veto held by the Board of Estimate and the limited veto power
of the Mayor would seem to be adequate safeguards in a representative government.
51. The apt term used by Professor Thomas H. Reed, an outstanding scholar and munici-
pal administrator, in his Municipal Government in the United States, c. vii (Rev. ed. 1934).
52. See Note 34 supra. The proposed Multiple Dwelling Code was drafted with the kind
of cooperation and joint effort of responsible City agencies and community groups and sub-
jected to the kind of scrutiny which could hardly occur during the brief State legislative
session.
53. There were approximately forty study sessions, including two officially announced
public hearings on the proposed Multiple Dwelling Code.
54. There were a number of Committee meetings at which interested groups were heard
and one official public hearing on the stock car bill.
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44 and 45 of 1951, which required policemen to give thirty days' notice
of their intention to retire--a measure sponsored by the District Attorney
of Kings County to aid in his investigation of the Harry Gross book-
making scandaLas
Proceedings before both Council Committees and the Board of Estimate
in regard to significant local legislative proposals are characterized by a
freedom of discussion and a manifest effectiveness of public debate by
civic organizations, special interest groups and individual citizens quite
foreign to proceedings in the State Legislature. This practice of the City's
legislative bodies is in sharp contrast to that of the Legislature, typified by
the passage of the 1953 Transit and Fiscal Control Laws.0 The latter
statutes profoundly affected the City in its most important property, its
transit system, and its basic governmental powers, its tax and indebtedness
powers.57 Yet, they were hurried through the State Legislature in the
closing days of its session without an opportunity being accorded to City
community groups vitally interested in their impact to consider their com-
plex terms or discuss their effect.58
The shortness of the State legislative session, the practice of that body
doing little or no legislative work, apart from the mere introduction of
thousands of bills, until the closing week of the session, and the sheer
bulk of the work to be accomplished in a matter of a few daysu5 -- all these
factors combine to render impossible at the State Capitol the kind of
public deliberation and citizen participation in legislation, commonplace
in the New York City Council and the Board of Estimate.
It is concluded that both reasons of principle and practical considera-
tions point to the necessity of an expansion of New York City's legislative
powers and the full exercise of its existing authority.
As Professor Thomas H. Reed stated the case for municipal autonomy:
"Capacity for self-government can be acquired only by the practice of self-govern-
ment, and capacity for local self-government is the only safe basis for the great
democratic state. It is a notable fact that the practice of home rule breeds civic self-
respect and independence."ca
55. Mnutes of Public Hearings Relating to the Enactment of N.Y.C. Local Laws 44 and
45 of 1951; see also Gorman v. City, 280 App. Div. 39, 110 N.YS. 2d 711 (1st Dep't), afi'd,
304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E. 2d 881 (1952), cert. denied, 345 US. 962 (1953).
56. N.Y. Laws cc. 199-205, 205 (1953).
57. Richland, supra note 7.
58. See Transcript of Record, at 31-110, Salzman v. Impellitteri, note 8 supra.
59. Moscow, Politics in the Empire State c. X (1948).
60. Reed, op. cit supra note 51, at 146.
